in my view, deeply wrong and must be replaced with a realistic acknowledgment of the role of the Supreme Court as a political actor of limited jurisdiction. I will illustrate these claims by discussing a number of important public law cases, recent and not-so-recent.
What does it mean to say there is very little "law" in American constitutional law? That requires us to have some view about what it means to say law exists, and so I must begin with some discussion of basic jurisprudential questions. I will here follow the most promising theory about the nature of law, the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and his student Joseph Raz.
1 Let us start with some terminology.
Human societies are awash in norms, by which I mean demands of the form, "You ought to do X" or "You ought not do Y." 2 Some norms are merely norms of etiquette: for example, "You ought not talk on your cell phone during the lecture" or "You ought not talk with your mouth full at the table." Others are norms of prudence or self-interest: "You ought to attend class, lest you fail the exam!" Some are moral norms: "You ought to consider how your actions will affect the well-being of others." And some are norms of the legal system, for example, "You ought not go faster than 55 mph on the highway." The categories are not mutually exclusive: sometimes moral norms (e.g., "You ought not murder innocents") are also legal norms, and sometimes norms of prudence are too (e.g., "You must wear a seatbelt while driving"). Norms of etiquette are rarely legal norms, many moral norms are not legal ones, and many legal norms are not ones we think of as representing moral or ethical obligations (we don't think the English are immoral for driving on the left rather than the right, but we recognize they have a legal obligation to do so There are many other kinds of norms, for example permissions: "You may do X." I use deontic norms as the central case.
in virtue of which particular norms are taken to be norms of the legal system. Such criteria can include legislative enactment, executive orders, judicial decisions, and so on.
Rules of recognition in modern legal systems are, admittedly, complex. Consider: a norm is a valid norm of the California legal system if it has been enacted by the California legislature and signed by the Governor, and has not been deemed unconstitutional as a matter of state or federal law by a state or federal court and has not been preempted by a constitutional federal law; a norm can also be a valid norm in the California system if it has been enacted by the U.S. Congress and signed by the President, and has not been deemed unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9 th Circuit or by the U.S. Other judges will avert to originalist considerations, but do not regard them as decisive the way Justice Scalia purports to do. new wine in a decidedly old wineskin. There is no greater urgency about allowing people to possess guns for self-defense or defense of property today than there was thirty years ago, when the prevalence of violent crime was greater, or for that matter one hundred years ago.
Only the membership of the Supreme Court has changed.
If constitutional decisions are to be determined by the balance between liberals and conservatives on the Supreme Court, the fig-leafing that we find in Heller--the historicizing glaze on personal values and policy preferences--will continue to be irresistibly tempting to the justices, with their large and tireless staffs and their commitment to a mystique of "objective"
interpretation. There is no way to purge political principles from constitutional decision-making, but they do not have to be liberal or conservative principles. A preference for judicial modesty--for less interference by the Supreme Court with the other branches of government--cannot be derived by some logical process from constitutional text or history. It would have to be imposed. It would be a discretionary choice by the justices. But judging from Heller, it would be a wise choice. It would go some distance toward de-politicizing the Supreme Court. It would lower the temperature of judicial confirmation hearings, widen the field of selection of justices, and enable the Supreme Court to attend to the many important non-constitutional issues that it is inclined to neglect.
A preference for judicial modesty is, however, also a political choice, 12 as Judge Posner recognizes, one that will serve to immunize from judicial review whatever the prevailing ideology of the other branches of the government is at that time. So the real question is why, when we confirm Justices to the super-
12
There is ambiguity in the notion of a "political" choice, though the basic idea is that it is a choice motivated by adherence to a norm that has no legal status but instead reflects commitments for how the polity as a whole should be organized-such norms may run the gamut from partisanship for the narrow agenda of a particular party to a vision of the just society. 14 The Shelby decision did so based on the finding of five members of the superlegislature that Section 4-which specified the formula for determining which states with a history of voting discrimination required federal pre-approval for election law changes-is no longer necessary, contrary to the view, apparently, of the actual legislature seven years earlier.
In an opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts, the five super-legislators explained that while, "Congress compiled thousands of pages of evidence before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act," these did not justify the original 1965 formula for pre-clearance. 15 Why not? According to Chief Justice Roberts, there was "no logical relation" to the Section 4 requirements, that these requirements are "irrational" given the record, indeed, "played no role" in the pre-clearance formulas. 16 This is all just rhetorical flourish, of course, for a different legislative judgment: it is obviously not irrational to rectify a wrong with a possibly overinclusive measure when the wrong is sufficiently serious that one wants to secure its elimination. As Justice Smith, the federal government did not need to find a less burdensome alternative to a law that imposed incidental but substantial burdens on free exercise of religion.
The Hobby Lobby decision found, plausibly, that the owners of the closely held corporations challenging the mandate genuinely believed that life begins at conception, so that they genuinely believed that post-conception contraception was akin to murder.
30 I want to emphasize that three aspects of the Hobby Lobby decision seem to me fairly banal, given the existence of RFRA: first, that the free exercise of religion of a closely held corporation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the free exercise of religion by the individuals who closely own the corporation (in other words, closely held corporations are "persons" for purposes of RFRA); second, that since the federal government had already provided an opt-out provision from the mandate for non-profit entities with religious objections (like the University of Notre Dame), one that did not shift costs to the employees seeking contraceptive coverage, then it was clear that there were regulatory alternatives available to the federal government to insure that contraception was available to female employees that did not impose a substantial burden on religious belief; and third, that under our constitutional regime of religious liberty, courts must take seriously someone's religious belief that life begins at conception. I, myself, disagree with this latter aspect of our constitutional system, just as I also think RFRA is a bad law, 31 but that is not at issue in my doubts about Hobby Lobby. My doubts lie elsewhere.
The crucial legal question presented in Hobby Lobby, granting the points I have just conceded, is whether requiring a closely held corporation to pay for health insurance that an employee might use to access medical services of which her employer disapproves constitutes a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of the employer's religion in a society which is not a theocracy, that is, in a society in which, for example, employees need not subscribe to the religion of their employers. The idea that it would constitute a substantial burden ought to have seemed preposterous on its face. Yet in the majority opinion of the super-legislature by Justice Alito, we are told that the belief of the owners of the closely held corporations that their paying for insurance which their employees could use to secure contraceptive services of which their employers disapprove "implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another." 32 It is not for the courts, Justice Alito asserts, to tell "the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed." 33 The job of the courts is only to determine whether the beliefs are sincere religious beliefs, which everyone, including me, grants that they are.
This sounds reasonable until one considers a scenario in which the religious plaintiffs profess the following putatively religious belief: "This law substantially burdens our free exercise of religion." That looks rather like a legal conclusion masquerading as a religious belief, but now we need to ask how such a scenario is any different from the position of the challengers in Hobby Lobby? If you believe that paying for medical insurance that can be used by your employees to access medical procedures of which you disapprove violates your free exercise rights, that's a legal question for the courts: the courts can grant that you really believe this, indeed, that you hold a particular philosophical or religious view about "the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another." But calling it a "philosophical" or religious view does not change the fact that it states a legal conclusion, namely, that the law requiring you to pay for the medical insurance substantially burdens your religion.
In short, we can agree with Justice Alito that the Supreme Court has long held that it will not adjudicate whether religious beliefs are sensible, only whether they are religious and sincerely held. But that does not mean that the courts must defer to the religious person's beliefs about whether the law substantially burdens their religion: that has to be a legal question for the courts, or the courts are out of business. The super-legislature should have acted like an actual court and found there was no "substantial burden" on Hobby Lobby.
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Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
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Id.
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Justice Ginsburg makes this point in dissent. Id. at 2798.
It is important to notice that the mistake in Justice Alito's reasoning was, in fact, a legal mistake, not in the sense that he failed to recognize the relevant sources of law but in the sense that he failed to understand the conceptual or logical entailments from those sources. More precisely, Justice Alito failed to correctly distinguish the legal question whether a particular law actually imposes a "substantial burden" on religious exercise from the non-legal question that courts are not supposed to adjudicate, The public is not wholly ignorant, to be sure. A CBS News poll in 2012 found that three quarters of Americans believe that Supreme Court justices "sometimes let their personal or political views influence their decisions." See http://www.pollingreport.com/court.htm. The Public Religion Institute in 2013 found that 55% of those surveyed thought Supreme Court Justices were influenced by their own political views "a lot, while 32% though they were influneced only "a little," and 8% "not at all." Despite these suspicions, when Supreme Court Justices are confirmed in public by the Senate, inquiry into their personal or political views is treated as off-limits. (Thanks to Mike Seidman for help on this topic.) possibly anticipate all the problems that will arise. In other words, appellate judges must exercise moral and political judgment, an unavoidable part of their job. Senator Thurmond, already well into his dotage, did not respond to the actual answer, but moved on to the next question in his script. Now we come to the punchline of this curious story: when Judge Posner received the transcript of his confirmation hearing several weeks later, Senator Thurmond's initial question was correctly recorded, namely, "Mr. Posner, if appointed to the Court, will you regard it as your obligation to apply the law as written rather than make new law?" But instead of Posner's actual answer, the transcript read that Posner simply replied, "Yes."
Now this is America in 1981, not Stalinist Russia, yet a federal judicial nominee's actual answer to a silly question by a political hack was erased from the historical record in order to comport with the political agenda of a President-Ronald Reagan-who liked to claim that he only wanted to appoint judges who apply the law, rather than make the law. But Reagan and his advisors knew this was nonsense, just like Judge Posner: they knew that appellate judges must inevitably exercise moral and political judgment beyond the issues settled by the law in order to resolve the actual disputes that come before the appellate courts. How, in a democratic society, can such secrecy be justified?
In my view, it cannot. We should tell the truth to the electorate: law makers cannot anticipate all problems that will arise, but in a civilized society, we need courts to provide authoritative resolutions of disputes which are left unsettled by the existing sources of law. Courts play that role, and the "higher" the court, the more likely it is that court will be asked to exercise circumscribed moral and political judgment, akin to what we expect from honest legislators, assuming that term is not an oxymoron in America these days. Therefore, when such judges are to be appointed, the nominal representatives of the people should evaluate the quality of moral and political judgment the nominee would exercise. Will the nominee reflexively side with markets against state regulation, with majorities against minorities, with the religious against the non-religious, with color-blindness against sensitivity to the pernicious role of race in society, with the police against criminal defendants, with the current ideological fixations of the Republican Party against the current ideological fixations of the Democratic Party? Is the nominee sensitive to injustice, to the powerless, to the losers in the political process, or does he or she side reflexively with those in power, with the status quo? These questions should be central to the confirmation process of members of the super-legislature-or rather, they should be central in public to that process, since they are obviously central to the actual nominators. They are also, to be sure, the subject of speculation, rumors and gossip, but that is not the same as making them central to the actual proceedings in which the Senate confirms a nominee. There are, certainly, many issues in which legal expertise is essential, but there is no shortage of candidates with the requisite expertise to parse technical points of law and it is rare indeed that a President puts forward a candidate for the super-legislature lacking that competence. What is not rare, unfortunately, is for Presidents to put forward candidates for the super-legislature whom they choose based on their moral and political views, but then fail to acknowledge that fact to the rest of the polity, indeed, to object when the Senate even asks about those views.
There is, one must acknowledge, a genuine worry about encouraging candor on these matters.
The worry, simply put, is that it will embolden judges to overreach the legal limits even more than they already do. Perhaps so, but the status quo is that elected officials appoint super-legislators because of their moral and political views, but no one is permitted to discuss that fact in public. If, in fact, we had a public discussion of what all the insiders know-namely, that appellate judges at the highest levels must exercise moral and political judgment-then perhaps those judges who actually survive the process will be those whose moral and political judgments comport more closely with those of the polity at large? 37 A polity that might welcome a liberal one decade might not welcome her a decade later, and so that is 37 I assume, for the sake of argument here, that majority approval suffices to "legitimate" the moral and political views of the judges. For independent reasons, this strikes me as dubious, but that would require a separate argument. yet another reason to abolish lifetime tenure for federal judges in favor of fixed term appointments, as other scholars have proposed. 38 But even before that happens, I do not see how in a democratic society where transparency in the exercise of public power (outside a select realm of areas, such as national security) is a fundamental value we can continue to tolerate the current charade of nominating lawyers to the United States Supreme Court without vetting, fully and in public, their moral and political views which will determine their decisions in a range of momentous constitutional matters, and sometimes not only there. 
